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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Abstract 
In a capability-centered acquisition paradigm, with many interacting and interdependent 
systems, new approaches are needed for addressing the architecting and acquisition of 
individual systems to achieve capability targets. Prior research work has explored the use of 
a Computational Exploratory Model (CEM; Mane & DeLaurentis, 2011) and a Markov network 
model (Mane, DeLaurentis, & Frazho, 2011) to evaluate complex development networks of 
system-of-systems (SoS) architectures. The present paper complements this line of work with 
a portfolio management approach as a decision tool in the acquisition and integration of 
systems within an SoS context. The approach leverages potential SoS-level capability gains 
from the integration of individual systems against cost and developmental risks due to system 
interdependencies. An example application using the Littoral Combat Ship is provided to 
demonstrate the approach. Congruence of the method in relation to potential benefits of 
system vendor-level competition in light of open architecture (OA) considerations is also 
addressed. 
Introduction 
A system-of-systems (SoS) consists of a network of operationally and managerially 
independent systems that work synergistically in achieving an overarching capability (Maier, 
1998). This confluence of multiple entities gives rise to an emergent behavior that may not 
be explicitly apparent from the development of its individual constituents. The establishment 
of an SoS paradigm has motivated the development of new acquisition strategies and 
integration of individual systems to better address the issue of achieving a set of overall 
capabilities instead of requirement-specific metrics. Acquisition efforts of SoS capabilities for 
projects such as the U.S. Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS; Gilmore, 2006) and the 
U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater System have been met with a large degree of 
developmental difficulties. This includes a combination of vulnerabilities in the 
developmental stage and poor management oversight that often leads to costly schedule 
overruns and, ultimately, cancellations. These large-scale systems are often developed 
incrementally with system-level requirements being the immediate focus of attention. Implicit 
consideration is given to the overarching objectives of the intended SoS capability. The 
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decoupled and decentralized nature of architecting SoS across multiple hierarchies of 
interdependencies has given rise to a range of inefficiencies and warranted the adaptation 
of current SE practices to now encompass SoS principles.  
The recognition of the need for improved methods in architecting and acquiring 
systems that comprise an SoS has led to further research in developing frameworks that 
maximize SoS-wide capabilities while minimizing cost and mitigating risk. Prior funded 
efforts have introduced the concept of a Computational Exploratory Model (CEM)—a 
discrete event simulator for the development and acquisition process. The CEM is based on 
the 16 basic technical management and technical system-engineering processes outlined in 
the Defense Acquisition Guidebook—referred to as the 5000-series guide. The method also 
considers the modified processes in accordance with the Systems Engineering Guide for 
System-of-Systems (SoS-SE) that adapts the 5000-series guide processes to the SoS 
framework. Research work in this paper provides a complementary decision-making tool 
that provides a means of balancing capability development against cost and interdependent 
risks through the use of modern portfolio theory (MPT).  
Portfolio management techniques have been successfully used to address strategic-
level asset acquisition and are extendable to include multi-period considerations. Real 
options analysis, for example, has shown effectiveness across various industries to evaluate 
discrete, long-term investment strategies. The work by Komoroski, Housel, Hom, and Mun 
(2006) has developed a methodology that addressees strategic financial decisions through 
an eight-phase process using a toolbox of financial techniques—including portfolio 
optimization techniques. Such frameworks are geared towards financial uncertainty 
considerations of strategic projects and do not explicitly address technical architecture 
and/or evolving SoS-wide capabilities.  
Figure 1 is a simplified adaptation of a wave model structure from current literature 
(Lane, Dahmann, Rebovich, & Lowry, 2010; Dahmann et al., 2011) on SoS artifacts and 
their employment in the engineering of SoS architectures. The model is adapted here to 
include hierarchy and time scale that ranges from the broad, overarching objectives that are 
strategic in nature (γ-level) to the tactical aspects of individual system (and subsystem) 
acquisition (α-level). Research in this paper addresses the β-level SoS portfolio 
development stage that evaluates candidate systems and, consequently, selects a portfolio 
of interdependent systems to fulfill overarching SoS capability objectives. The idea is to still 
maintain compliance with the “top-down integration, bottoms-up implementation” paradigm 
that is part of the wave model implementation. The portfolio method will better assist in the 
architecting of these SoS constructs at the evaluation phase so as to improve upon decision 
processes in expanding capabilities. 
 
Figure 1. SoS Acquisition Hierarchy 
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The framework proposed in this paper does not attempt to replace, but rather to 
complement existing methodologies by more directly addressing issues of integration and 
acquisition from a robust portfolio theory standpoint. Robust methodologies have been 
widely used by financial engineering practitioners to manage portfolios in the face of market 
volatility and uncertainties. In the present context, such quantitative guidance is important 
for providing acquisition groups with the means of performing acquisition, integration, and 
development decisions in the midst of evolving capability requirements. 
Development of an Investment Model 
Acquisition Strategy: Investment Portfolio Approach 
A key component of this research is the development of an ability to balance 
capability and risk in acquiring systems in an SoS context. The investment portfolio 
approach presented in this section does not attempt to replace but rather complements 
existing methodologies by more directly addressing issues of integration and acquisition 
from a robust portfolio theory standpoint. Robust methodologies have been more recently 
used by financial engineering practitioners to manage portfolios in the face of market 
volatility and uncertainties. The developed approach in this section is also aimed at 
improved means of performing acquisition, integration, and development decisions while 
maintaining advantages in balancing systems acquisition against evolving capability 
requirements. The research work in this section also addresses more recent efforts in 
acquisition that have emphasized the implementation of open architectures and modularity 
to facilitate competition (to lower costs) and innovation.  
Open Architectures, Competition, and Modularity 
Open architecture (OA) involves the design and implementation of systems that 
conform to a common and unified set of technical interfaces and business standards. This 
form of architecture results in the development of modular systems and increases 
opportunities for innovation and rapid development of new technologies that can be readily 
integrated/swapped into current architectures. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, for 
example, has recognized the need for multi-vendor acquisitions and OA implementations to 
ensure greater technological adaptability. The LCS program exploits the benefits of dual-
award contracting under fixed-price initiatives (FPI), along with rapid technology insertion 
processes and open architectures, to fulfill the evolving technological and mission 
requirements of littoral warfare. The combination of dual contracting and system modularity 
helps achieve the necessary cost reductions while maintaining a greater degree of 
adaptability towards changing mission requirements (“LCS,” 2011; GAO, 2007). Although 
the platform is not, strictly speaking, an SoS, it nevertheless is a representative microcosm 
of what constitutes an SoS and carries many comparable salient features, such as the 
confluence of multiple (sub) systems within it that work cohesively to achieve required 
capabilities. 
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Figure 2. Littoral Combat Ship Layout 
(“LCS,” 2011) 
The benefits of open architectures and competitive contracting are intuitively clear 
and have been shown to generate notable cost savings as exhibited in previous 
development projects such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM; GAO, 2007). However, 
system integrators and program managers are often faced with the challenge of leveraging 
the potential benefits of introducing new and improved systems against potential risks 
associated with developmental disruptions and cost considerations. Although the LCS 
program had significant success through the dual-contracting scheme, it still experienced 
cost overruns due to a variety of problems. The problems included risks from a simultaneous 
design and build strategy due to schedule constraints, unrealistic budget expectations, and 
market risk from the greatly increased price of steel during the development period 
(O’Rourke, 2011). There have also been revisions in the requirements of fleet capabilities 
and refocusing of intended capabilities (O’Rourke, 2011). 
Concept Acquisition Portfolio: Littoral Combat Ship Example 
The littoral combat ships are designed and developed by two primary contractors—
General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin—as a result of the Navy’s dual contract award 
strategy that seeks to minimize costs through competitive contracting. The ships are 
designed to serve as primary units in close coastal littoral warfare and take advantage of 
modularized onboard packages (systems) that are interchangeable for different operational 
requirements. These packages include the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Mine Counter 
Measure (MCM), and Surface Warfare (SUW) packages. More recent developments have 
seen the introduction of an irregular warfare package for assistance and general support 
missions. Although the LCS is not, strictly speaking, an SoS, it nevertheless exhibits striking 
resemblance to one where the conglomeration of systems provide the intended overarching 
capabilities. The ongoing work in this demonstration assumes a representative acquisition 
problem using the LCS acquisition case where the objective is to achieve desired combat 
effectiveness and operational capabilities while minimizing cost and development risk. The 
simple model inputs and characteristics are described in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Individual System Information 
 
Table 1 is a hypothetical and simplified catalogue of individual systems available to 
the Navy in its pursuit of achieving desired capabilities. Although the numbers are 
hypothetical and do not explicitly illustrate real data, the salient features of considering 
capabilities, requirements, and risk in acquisition problems are still preserved. Table 1 lists 
systems that are available for each of the three mission packages—ASW, MCM, SUW—
along with an individual rating of system capabilities and requirements for the systems to 
operate. Additionally, Table 1 provides the system development time and associated 
acquisition costs. Systems that are unable to provide a particular capability (or do not have a 
particular requirement) have a zero entry. Although the sea frame is typically a single 
system, the current sample problem couples the sea frame with battle management 
software as a base system that provides intra-system capabilities. The development of these 
systems is based on a projected time schedule that is inherently subject to overruns and 
risk. This element is captured in the covariance matrix shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. System Interdependency and Development Risk (Covariance) 
 
Table 2 shows the risk and interdependency aspects of the decision process. The 
diagonal terms represent the variance (degree of deviation from expected time) in 
System Capabilities System  Develop Acq.
Req. Time Cost
Weapon Threat Anti Mine Comm. Air/Sea State Air/Sea Comm. (Years) ($)
Strike Detection  Detection Capacity Capacity State
Range Range Speed
Package
ASW Variable Depth 0 50 0 0 0 0 250 3 3000000
Multi Fcn Tow 0 40 0 0 0 0 150 2 2000000
Lightweight tow 0 30 0 0 0 0 100 4 4000000
MCN RAMCS II 0 0 40 0 0 3 200 1 1000000
ALMDS (MH‐60) 0 0 30 0 0 4 100 2 2000000
SUW N‐LOS Missiles 25 0 0 0 0 0 200 3 3000000
Griffin Missiles 3 0 0 0 0 0 100 4 4000000
Seaframe Package System 1  0 0 0 400 4 0 0 3 3000000
& Combat Package System 2 0 0 0 300 4 0 0 4 4000000



































































Variable Depth 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Multi Fcn Tow 0 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0
Lightweight tow 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2
RAMCS II 0 0 0 0.3 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0
ALMDS (MH‐60) 0 0 0 1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.3
N‐LOS Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.2 0 0.1 0
Griffin Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.3 0 0 0
Package System 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0
Package System 2 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.1 0 0 0.3 0
Package System 3 0 0 0.2 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0.2
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development time. The off-diagonal terms are the variances due to interdependencies 
between individual systems that have commonly developed subsystems. For example, since 
the N-LOS and Griffin missile systems are both developed by Northrop Grumman, it is 
conceivable that they have common parts or undergo similar processes in development and 
manufacturing. The covariance value in the cross term therefore represents joint 
development risk due to interdependencies between two systems.  
Estimation of these quantities can come directly from manufacturing and 
development data. In the case of new systems, the quantities can be estimated heuristically 
using basic rules similar to those used in project management techniques such as PERT 
and other CPM methods (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2005). The entries of the matrix in Table 2 
are typically inferred from data; in this case, the values are hypothetically developed for the 
concept example problem. Most of the individual systems do not bear many 
interdependencies, with the exception of the sea frame and combat management support 
systems that are interlinked more explicitly to other listed systems in Table 2. 
Investment Model Formulation and Solution  
The problem statement for the given acquisition problem is formulated as a 
mathematical optimization problem, which requires the definition of two primary segments; 
these are the objective function and constraints. The objective function is the equation that 
describes the primary metric to be optimized. This typically translates to, for example, the 
maximization of profits or minimization of costs/risk in the commercial sense. The second 
important aspect deals with the formulation of constraints, which are equations that typically 
describe resource (e.g., time and cost) constraints on the system and can be manipulated to 
reflect the salient conditions of the problem to be solved. The investment portfolio problem 
presented in the formulation shown below (also known as the Markowitz formulation) seeks 
to maximize the aggregate capabilities of an SoS architecture, while minimizing the 
cumulative effect of cost, developmental time, and integration risks. The mathematical 
model for the concept problem can be written as follows: 
   max Tqc c B F F Bq q ij q q q
q qc
S R
w X X X C X
R








    (2) 
Budget (Budget Constraint)Bq q
q
C X  
    (3) 
(Satisfy All System Requirements)B BqC q qR q
q q
S X S X 
   (4) 
1 1 1 1  (ASW  System Compatibility)
B B BX X X      (5) 
4 5 1  (M CM  System  Compatibility)
B BX X     (6) 
6 7 1  (SU W  System  C om patibility)
B BX X      (7) 
8 9 10 1  (Package System C ompatibility)
B B BX X X     (8) 
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The mathematical model shown by Equations 1–9 represents the formulation of a 
traditional single-stage optimization problem that is typical of operations research and 
financial engineering circles. The current form for the portfolio model at hand is known as a 
quadratic integer program (QIP) and is based on the Markowitz formulation that seeks to 
generate optimal portfolios that balance potential expected rewards against risk. Equation 1 
is the objective function. The objective is to maximize overall capability while minimizing cost 
and development risk. Equation 2 is the fraction of the budget invested in individual 
systems. Equation 3 is the budgeting constraints, where the sum of all investments in 
individual systems (and savings) must be equal to the total budget allotted. Equation 4 
ensures that all requirements of individual systems must be met. Equations 5–7 are the 
individual system compatibilities. In Equations 5–7, this translates to the selection of one 
system from each mission package (ASW, MCM, SUW) and a sea frame and combat 
management package that services the mission modules. These packages are mutually 
exclusive and, therefore, warrant a total selection of summation equal to 1, which ensures 
that no two packages per category are selected to satisfy the respective requirements. The 
covariance matrix, as denoted by ij , represents variations in development time due to 
system interdependencies. The formulation is amenable to several methods of solution 
using both freeware and commercially available solvers that are written with system 
integration and IT considerations in mind. Models using these solver platforms are readily 
integrated into IT environments and enterprise systems, providing a model-centric 
environment for the decision-making process. 
Investment Portfolio Robustification 
It is well known in financial engineering circles that the Markowitz formulation, as 
used in the simplified LCS scenario, is sensitive to changes in estimated quantities of the 
covariance matrix (system interdependencies) and expected return (system performance). 
The sensitivity due to poor covariance estimations can result in highly inefficient portfolios 
due to errors in estimation or market shifts. Such sensitivity issues have prompted the 
development of a variety of robust methods in portfolio analysis to ensure that the chosen 
portfolio of assets is stable against potential changes in market conditions/expected 
volatility. 
The current portfolio formulation in Equations 1–9 can be reformulated using robust 
optimization techniques; this includes semi-definite programming (SDP) approaches 
(Fabozzi, Kolm, Pachamanova, & Focardi, 2007; Tutuncu & Cornuejols, 2007) that are 
extensions of modern portfolio and control theory. The reformulation allows for possible 
changes in estimated quantities (e.g., due to market shifts in pricing, volatility, system 
interdependencies) to be accounted for more explicitly as uncertainty sets. The resulting 
portfolio allocation will not change appreciably even if salient estimated quantities or benefits 
change (within prescribed limits). In the context of an acquisition problem, the use of a 
robust formulation translates to reduced costs associated with capability estimation errors, 
development time volatility, and changing requirement conditions. 
The general form of the portfolio problem in this research can be reposed as a robust 
optimization problem, given by the following form (Fabozzi et al., 2007; Tutuncu & 
Cornuejols, 2007): 
   max min max TiUx Ux x x             (10) 
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AX B      (11) 
CX=D      (12) 
0, 0         (13) 
   ˆ ˆ| | , 1, ...,i i iU i N            (14) 
ij ij
L U    
     (15) 
Although the complexity of the optimization problem increases, it is nevertheless very 
amenable to a collection of numerical methods that provide good computational 
performance for realistic portfolio problems, especially portfolios with high volatility (Fabozzi 
et al., 2007). Equation 10 denotes the robust form of the objective function in Equation 1. 
Equations 11 and 12 are the generalized linear form that represents the linear relationships 
in Equations 3–8. Equations 14 and 15 are the uncertainty bounds of the performance 
(capability) and operational risk due to interdependencies in each system. The portfolio 
formulation of the LCS sample problem, as shown in Equations 1–9, is rewritten to now 
incorporate the uncertainties that are associated with estimation of the covariance matrix 
and the effective capabilities of individual systems. The demonstration LCS problem 
assumes an uncertain covariance matrix and utilizes the conversion methodology as 
detailed in literature (Fabozzi et al., 2007) to convert the problem into an SDP. Equations 1–
9 are adapted into the robust framework in Equations 10–15 to yield the following SDP: 
   max qc c B Bq q q
q qc
S R
w X C X
R
           









    
(17) 
Budget (Budget Constraint)Bq q
q
C X  
   (18) 
(Satisfy All System Requirements)B BqC q qR q
q q
S X S X 
  (19) 
1 1 1 1  (ASW  System Compatibility)
B B BX X X      (20) 
4 5 1  (M CM  System  Compatibility)
B BX X     (21) 
6 7 1  (SU W  System  Com patibility)
B BX X     (22) 
8 9 10 1  (Package System Compatibility)
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(Linear Matrix Inequality)   
(24) 
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{0,1}(binary)BqX       (25) 
Equations 16–25 retain most of their original form from Equations 1–9. The 
exceptions are that the uncertainty in the covariance matrix and absolute value bounds on 
the capability weighting vector, w, are reintroduced via exploitation of the dual form of the 
problem, now an SDP. The reparametization of the problem as an SDP manifests as 
additional terms in the objective function and constraints, namely, Equations 24 and 25. 
Equation 24 is a linear matrix inequality and enforces the condition of positive definiteness 
due to the symmetry of the matrix and positive values of all variables in the problem.  
The uncertainty set of the covariance, as defined in Equation 15, is assumed to be 
+/- 10% of each respective entry in the matrix. This is arbitrarily chosen for this LCS 
demonstration problem; however, real-world problems will require the estimation of these 
bounds from statistical measures, such as through the use of confidence intervals. 
Additional measures, such as factor models, can be used to estimate the values of the 
covariance with respect to relevant drivers; for an SoS problem, metrics such as the TRL 
and SRL that are shown to relate directly to project risk may be used. 
Littoral Combat Portfolio: Results
 The presented portfolio optimization problem is modeled and solved by varying the 
risk aversion parameter, , each time to generate the robust performance efficiency frontier. 
By changing this parameter, the portfolio’s aversion to risk is increased as the penalty effect 
of   is more pronounced with increasing value. The increase in   forces the portfolio to 
select systems that are lower risk and, consequently, results in a lower performance SoS 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Robust Portfolio Efficiency Frontier 
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Figure 4. System Capabilities 
Figures 3 and 4 show the robust efficiency frontier and individual portfolio of 
capabilities, respectively, for the LCS investment problem. In Figure 3, each point on the 
frontier is a portfolio that corresponds to a chosen level of risk aversion and shows the 
amount of variance associated with it. The higher the risk aversion, the lower the expected 
SoS performance due to the trade-off in choosing say, older, more reliable technology over 
newer technologies with lower TRL values. The table within Figure 3 shows the portfolio 
allocation for each of the three critical points on the frontier. Typical efficiency frontiers will 
have more points due to the combinatorial possibilities of systems available to the portfolio 
selection process. One system is common across all three portfolios, which indicates that 
this system has high performance and relatively low risk. Some systems, however, exhibit 
increased SoS-wide performance, but with added intersystem risk. The trade-off between 
individual SoS capabilities (ASW, MCN, SUW) and risk is shown in Figure 4. The analysis, 
as shown in Figures 3 and 4, is useful for acquisition practitioners to determine the 
appropriate balance of SoS-wide performance against developmental risk. 
Potential Extension: Multi-Period Investment Portfolio 
The general portfolio formulation in the current work considers a static portfolio 
approach without consideration for sequential, multi-period investment horizons. Strategic 
decisions are performed through sequential, shorter term acquisitions that incrementally 
expand the capabilities of an SoS architecture. These shorter term acquisitions need to 
account for their potential impact on future acquisitions, making it a multi-period investment 
problem. 
The addition of multi-step considerations into the decision process makes the 
problem amenable to dynamic programming and control theory methods (Powell, 2011). 
This generally amounts to the objective of the optimization problem being rewritten as the 
following: 
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 (26) 
The objective function now reflects consequential effects where current acquisition 
decisions affect later decisions as denoted by the expectation term of the equation. The 
stochastic nature of the problem lends itself to being a stochastic optimization problem, 
which has a variety of efficient and industry-tested solutions, such as approximate dynamic 
programming (ADP). The current motivation is to, thus, bring these tools to bear upon the 
immediate acquisition problem, keeping enterprise, model-centric architectures of decision-
making processes in mind.  
Conclusions and Future Work 
The development of SoS architectures involves a complex process of identifying 
systems that fulfill mission objectives while mitigating risk. The cascading effects of system 
interdependencies in an SoS hierarchy requires effective tools to manage the uncertainties 
in risk estimation to allow for effective acquisition decisions to be made. The robust portfolio 
framework in this paper addresses the identification of portfolios of systems that can fulfill 
specified capabilities while taking these estimation uncertainties into account. 
A simple representation of the LCS program as an acquisitions problem 
demonstrates the framework. The objective is to select a portfolio of interconnected 
(compatible) systems that fulfill overarching capability objectives under acceptable 
operational risk. The resulting efficiency frontier of three portfolios shows how certain 
systems are more prone to contributing to overall SoS risk than others due to 
interconnectivity, performance, and risk characteristics within each system. The analysis 
enables acquisition practitioners to select portfolios of systems that maximize performance 
at accepted levels of risk under conditions of uncertainty. 
 Further work is to be directed at extension of the current framework to multi-period 
considerations and alternate measures in the objective and constraints to account for 
additional SoS architecting metrics. The sequential nature of capability expansion, evolving 
requirements, and changing market conditions makes such extensions a natural 
complement to addressing these issues. 
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